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Abstract: La Presidenza del Consiglio in Italia (1948-2016) – This work is 
divided into four parts. The first is an excursus on the difficult birth and 
organization of the Italian Prime Minister’s office. The second relates the 
principal administrative reforms of the core executive during the 80s and 90s 
with particular attention to the role of the head of government. The third part 
concerns the two aspects of the Prime Minister’s role – administration and 
decision making –during the Silvio Berlusconi era (the longest lasting 
government in the history of Republican Italy). Finally, the fourth part proposes 
an initial analysis of the changes made in the Prime Minister’s office of the Renzi 
government. 
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1. Introduction 
Between the 1990s and the 2000s many democracies have been witness to a rise 
in their executive with a consequent reinforcement of the top political-
administrative structures1 and to a growing centralization within these 
structures of the authority of the head of government, whether he be the 
President or the Prime Minister2. 
In this true and proper “search for the centre” by contemporary 
governments we can analytically distinguish two levels: one concerning the 
ambit of administrative reform and the other concerning the monocratic and 
personalistic centrality of the Prime Minister’s power. 
Emblematic in this regard is the case of the administrative reorganization 
of the Italian governments where “a sort of reform of the centre is being carried 
out –through the subtraction of functions and the redefinition of the organizational 
structures – called upon to become the unifying element of the action of a series 
                                                                 
1 G. Peters, W. Rhodes e V. Wright Administering the Summit. Administration of the Core 
Executive in Developed Countries, London, 2000; A Criscitiello, Il cuore dei governi. Napoli, 
2004.  
2 T. Poguntke e P. Webb (eds), The Presidentialization of Politics, Oxford, 2005; F. Musella 
and P. Webb (eds) The Personal Leader in Contemporary Party Politics, Rivista Italiana di 
Scienza Politica/Italian Political Science Review, 45, 3, Cambridge, 2015. 
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of administrative systems and the linking element between the different levels of 
government”3. In effect, this process has been carried out by the Presidency of 
the Council of Ministries (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, PCM): a sort of 
privileged laboratory where one of the most interesting administrative policy 
changes over the last 25 years has developed. 
As regards the rise of the Prime Minister’s role, we have observed a 
process of presidentialization of the executive which has involved the 
parliamentary systems and caused a rise in power of the head of government, 
who Cassese defined as an elected monarch4. A process that is particularly evident 
in Italy. 
The starting point, interesting from a political sciences perspective and its 
research agenda, is the reform process of the executive through its top structures 
which has to all effects been carried out without any changes in the constitution. 
That is, they have on one hand made use of organizational procedures and on the 
other relied on administrative solutions, very often, as we shall see, under the 
direct responsibility of the head of government. 
In this process of policy change that has invested many western 
democracies Italy represents one of the most interesting cases. In fact, it is the 
only country that has put its hopes for governability in the constitutional type of 
political reform without proposing a real constitutional revision, at least until 
2016. 
The Italian case has thus become the emblem of a suspension between an 
entirely administrative reform of the top executive (the only reform that has in 
fact been implemented) and the many attempts (so far unsuccessful) to revise the 
Constitution regarding the form of government. The longstanding need for 
improvements in governability has in fact often been associated with 
Constitutional reforms which have in reality always failed, right up to the 
constitutional referendum in December 2016. 
This work is divided into four parts. In the first we give an excursus on the 
difficult birth and organization of the Italian Prime Minister’s office. In the 
second we relate the principal administrative reforms of the core executive 
during the eighties and nineties with particular attention to the role of the head 
of government. The third part concerns the two aspects of the Prime Minister’s 
role – administration and decision making –during the Silvio Berlusconi era 
(today the longest lasting government in the history of Republican Italy). 
Finally, the fourth part proposes an initial analysis of the changes made in the 
Prime Minister’s office of the Renzi government. 
2. A story of a government without a Prime Minister’s office 
For reasons that depend mostly on the period in which the new Constitution of 
the Republic was written, the Italian government was born as a weak 
                                                                 
3 A. Pajno e L. Torchia, La riforma del governo, Bologna, 2000, 64 
4 S. Cassese, Il potere esecutivo nei sistemi parlamentari di governo, in «Quaderni Costituzionali», 
n. 1, pp. 141-148, 1993. 
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institution5. Being so close in time to the fascist government meant that the 
founding fathers of the Constitution unanimously worked in fear of giving too 
much power to the executive, at the expense of the legislative power6 thus 
searching for a compromise between the monocratic principle and the collegiate 
principle in governance. Only with the passing of time the idea of an 
authoritative and stable executive with good initiative capabilities came into 
being as a way of improving parliament’s constitutional tasks and not as an 
obstacle to them7. 
Time was needed to fully believe that autonomy for the Prime Minister 
could contribute to contrasting the individualism of the members of parliament 
and inhibit the sectoriality of their own interests8 thus contrasting the 
inefficiency of “government by ministries”9. 
However, directly after the Second World War, the parties who wrote the 
Constitution did not really agree on how to make the government work in 
practice10. And in fact they did not solve the problem of organization of the 
Prime Minister’s office and staff, deciding instead to postpone it. The Italian 
Constitution, that deals with government in its Articles from 92 – 96, delegated 
the problem of its organization and top structures to ordinary legislation 
resulting in a legislative gap. Add to this the fact that all the governments were 
coalition governments on one side strengthened the individual autonomy of the 
ministers with a weak Prime Minister and, on the other, the absolute supremacy 
of the parties in decision making11. 
Up until the end of the seventies, in fact, there were very few attempts to 
reform government organization and the Prime Minister’s office. However, in 
those years the government did in some way function and so it became 
interesting to understand how. What in fact were the normative processes and 
organizational transformations that allowed it to function. It is a complex 
process – as we will see in the following pages – that is still ongoing and that has 
not received any systematic attention from political scientists. 
The Prime Minister’s office in Italy up until the end of the sixties was a 
weak and badly organized structure. Moreover, it had to share with the internal 
ministry not only the support of the legislative office but also its physical spaces, 
so much so that, for a long time, made room in its buildings to host the Prime 
Minister’s staff. 
The first government decree, dating back to De Gaspari, at the beginning 
of the Fifties, did not even reach the debate stage. It dealt with the organization 
                                                                 
5 S. Merlini, G. Tarli Barbieri, Il governo parlamentare in Italia, Torino, 2017. 
6 E. Rotelli, La Presidenza del consiglio dei ministri, Milano, 1972. 
7 G. Rolla, Il consiglio dei ministri tra modello costituzionale e prassi, in «Quaderni 
Costituzionali», 2, 1982, 367-398. 
8 A. Criscitiello, The political role of cabinet ministers in Italy, in M. Laver and K. A. Shepsle 
(eds), Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government, New York, pp. 187-200 1994. 
9 M. Cotta and L. Verzichelli, Sistema politico italiano, Bologna, 2016. 
10 P. A. Capotosti, Governo, in «Enciclopedia Giuridica», Roma, 1989). 
11 N. Conti and F. Marangoni (Eds), The Challenge of Coalition Government: The Italian Case, 
London, 2015.  
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of the prime ministry into five offices: the cabinet; legislative coordination; the 
coordination of public administration; information; entertainment and sport. 
This proposal was no more successful when it was re-presented, with significant 
modifications, firstly by the Segni government in 1956 and then by the Fanfani 
government in 1958. 
In those years, the Prime Minister’s office had an organizational structure 
similar to that of all the other ministries. The Prime Minister’s secretarial 
section was tiny, made up of about twenty people. It was supported by an office 
that initially had about thirty collaborators but which, with the passing of time, 
took on more and more competencies and functions that had little to do with the 
Prime Minister’s tasks of management and coordination and actually only 
considerably increased the number of staff. Moreover, offices were set up and 
assigned to ministers without portfolio and to committees that ended up 
becoming satellite bureaucratic systems orbiting around the Prime Minister’s 
office. 
An important proposal for reorganization was implemented by decree 
under the Prime Minister Aldo Moro at the end of his mandate in June 1964, all 
the more significant because it came in one of the most difficult stages of 
republican history12. It was an organizational chart divided into 8 structures 
supported by two offices (financial and public safety) and three secretarial offices: 
for the Prime Minister, the undersecretary and the head of the secretariat. After 
the Aldo Moro decree, the general organization of the structure of the Prime 
Minister’s office remained to all effects unchanged for about ten years. In 1974, a 
decree under the Prime Minister Rumor separated the offices in direct 
collaboration with the Prime Minister from those of the ministers without 
portfolio. 
Half way through the seventies, therefore, the Prime Minister’s office 
comprised: 
– The legal office for legislative coordination, the most important structure in the 
Prime Minister’s office, with the tasks of overseeing all the measures to be put 
before the Council of Ministers, coordinating the action of the government in 
Parliament and dealing with some of the Council related tasks, such as 
compiling the daily agenda and writing up the minutes on the basis of the 
undersecretary’s indications; 
– The office for administrative coordination, divided into structures each of which 
is competent for a group of subjects that come under the direct intervention of 
the Prime Minister. Despite the fact that administrative coordination is a key 
function of the Prime Minister’s office, it has long been considered less 
important than the former and its competencies are much less defined; 
– The office for the regions, that, starting from the regions under ordinary statute, 
assumed considerable importance in the control they exercised over the 
regional laws; 
                                                                 
12 G. Formigoni, Aldo Moro. Lo statista e il suo dramma, Bologna, 2016. 
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– The office for general affairs and personnel, with a wide range of competencies, 
the greatest being the one for the administration of all the staff in the Prime 
Minister’s office; 
– The office for the organization of public administration, which in the past was 
entrusted to a ministry without portfolio and took care of the coordination of 
public activities and bureaucratic organization; 
– Services for information and literary, artistic and scientific property, which deals 
with a series of activities that go from public communication to author’s 
copyrights. 
 
The ministries without portfolio looked after: 
 
– The office for scientific research 
– The office for extraordinary interventions in Southern Italy  
– The office for the implementation of Regions 
 
As can be seen, there was an organizational structure for the Prime 
Minister’s office that presented a series of problems, not least being the 
overlarge number of the structures themselves. On one side the Prime Minister’s 
office had become considerably heavier and, on the other, there was no well-
defined framework of the functions to be attributed to the ministers without 
portfolio and to the inter-ministerial committees. An example of this kind of 
organizational problem is the duplication of the structures destined to the 
government-regions relations, with an office for the control of the regional laws 
in the Prime Minister’s office and an office for the realization of the regions set 
up as an organizational support to the minister without portfolio, with the easily 
imagined repercussions on the coordination of the regional policies. 
Key sectors such as legislative and administrative coordination, 
organization of personnel and community affairs suffered a long process of 
administrative adaptations, often disorderly, and were now in need of a 
comprehensive reform policy. 
It is only at the end of the Seventies, however, and the beginning of the 
following decade that the debate on the reform of the organizational structure of 
the Prime Minister’s office, and more specifically, of the role of the head of 
government, reaches its turning point. 
Before then there had been very few legislation proposals, and those only 
partial and never completed, leading to the conclusion that there had been a true 
and proper failure in the reform policies of the Prime Minister’s office. In fact, 
despite the fact that since 1948 there had been an office for the reform of the 
administration, in reality the criteria for reorganization of the executive were not 
thoroughly considered. 
Among the more urgent objectives there was the identification of a well-
defined “consultant staff” or a system suitable to the directing function of the 
Prime Minister and the coordination between the ministerial initiatives and the 
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governing policies as a whole. Furthermore, the internal communication 
resources between the Prime Minister and the ministers needed improvement; 
the number and the roles of the committees had to be reduced; an independent 
structure for the staff needed setting up and mobility procedures needed to be 
made easier; and finally, separate and suitable structures had to be set up 
specifically for community policies and local institutions. 
One of the most interesting processes of institutionalization of the top 
government structures finally began with a series of normative measures that 
reorganized the PM’s office between the end of the seventies and the beginning 
of the following decade. 
 It is important to underline that it was not by chance that the reform 
policy of the Italian core executive started exactly when two new government 
spheres forcibly emerged and with which the central executive were obliged to 
interact: the regions and the European Community. They required unitary 
management and coordinated action. Multilevel governance, that is, requires a 
central government that can rely on an organizational structure that can only be 
the institution of reference of the Prime Minister and, therefore, his office. At the 
same time, the Prime Minister’s office became an ever more decisive objective of 
conquest for the party system, seeing as these are the years when the Democratic 
Christians lost their monopoly as governing leaders. Up until then, Palazzo 
Chigi was all in all a less appetizing objective than the leadership of the DC, the 
real centre of power. Except for the case of De Gaspari, for about thirty years the 
two posts of Prime Minister and leader of the party never coincided. The top 
components of the DC party who could aspire to the post of party leader always 
avoided the risk of direct responsibility in government leadership. Therefore, 
while in the sixties and seventies this presence is considered a real taboo, in the 
following decade things started to change, to the point that Andreotti – in 
reference to the De Mita experience of government – declared the importance of 
the presence, inside the executive, of the maximum exponents of the majority 
parties: “all things considered, I am convinced that a good model would be to 
have, inside the government, as ministers without portfolio, the leaders of the 
coalition parties, one of whom would be the leader of the government”13. The 
time seemed finally come to organize the actors and the modalities for the 
management of the ‘control room’. 
3. The reforms in the eighties and nineties 
The years we are now going to consider have a significant role in the «century of 
governments»14 and, as has been said with regard to the Italian case, in the 
century «of the monocratic executives»15.  
One of the ambits in which we can analyze the process of reinforcement of 
government is the one concerning the roles and structures of the so-called “core 
                                                                 
13 G. Andreotti, Governare con la crisi, Milano, 1991, 380. 
14 R. Dahrendorf, Dopo la democrazia, Roma-Bari, 2002. 
15 F. Musella, Governi monocratici, Bologna, 2009. 
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executives”16. In the last thirty years, many western democracies have 
implemented reform policies through the reorganization of the apical positions 
following three lines of action: a) centralizing some functions – especially general 
management and policy; b) decentralizing the merely managerial functions and 
c) creating new (and often informal) small collegial bodies. In the ambit of this 
system of relations the role of the head of the executive assumes significant 
importance. The transformation of his functions in the light of a reorganization 
of its staff, its dimensions, the type of personnel and the expertise that they can 
offer allows us to evaluate the improvement. 
This process obviously closely concerns also the Italian case where the 
Prime Minister has been dealing directly with the organizational reform of his 
office since the eighties. So, we have a true and proper period of experimentation 
and implementation of the organizational improvements of the Prime Minister’s 
office. 
This experimental phase starts with the implementation of a series of 
decrees and regulations issued by the Prime Minister’s office through which the 
Spadolini government, in office from June 1981, proceeded to reorganize the 
administration of his office17. We have, therefore, for the first time a non-
Christian Democrat Prime Minister who set the reorganization of the core 
executive during a political experience that he himself described as «not at all 
easy». In fact, he was a representative of those intermediate parties that, after the 
electoral turndown of the DC and the Communist Party (Pci) in the first years of 
the eighties, could now aspire to the leadership of Palazzo Chigi. But to do this 
they had to try and redefine the rules of the relationship between parliament and 
the executive, in such a way as to guarantee an efficient leadership: «only in this 
way could the Prime Minister’s office, accessible through the powerful force of a 
coalition, ensure results»18. 
It was in fact Spadolini, during the VIII legislation, who started that long 
process of legislative elaboration that led to the law no. 400 in 1988. On the crest 
of the wave of growing attention, also from public opinion, on the subject of 
institutional reform, and on the basis of the work done by the Amato 
commission, he proposed the so-called Decalogue, a formulation in ten points, of 
the government’s reform policy. The first three points directly concerned the 
Prime Minister’s functions: the implementation of autonomy for the Prime 
Minister in power to propose ministers; the introduction of an office for the 
coordination of institutional problems; the immediate resumption in parliament 
of the examination of the proposal for a law on the Prime Minister’s office. 
More generally, as has already been noted, the Spadolini Decalogue is very 
important because the reforming executive issue makes its appearance in 
government planning for the first time and is, therefore, formally presented on 
parliament’s agenda.  
                                                                 
16 M. J. Smith, The Core Executive in Britain, London,  1999 
17 P. Calandra, La presidenza Spadolini, in «Quaderni Costituzionali», n. 3, 1982, 669-684. 
18 P. Scoppola, La repubblica dei partiti. Evoluzione e crisi di un sistema politico, Bologna, 1997, 
444). 
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Last but not least, during his terms in government Spadolini also tried to 
face up to the chronic absence of a real policy for the PM’s staff by proposing a 
law for the reduction of the personnel, the creation of a role for employees and by 
favouring in every way possible mobility for the staff directors. On the other 
hand, his attention to the selection criteria of staff was one of the distinctive 
features of his government procedure. For the first time, in fact, a Prime 
Minister had made public the names, functions and professional background of 
his collaborators. 
Spadolini was followed in December 1982 by a very short lived 
government led by Amintore Fanfani with a four-party coalition interpreted by 
many as the first sign of an alternation at Palazzo Chigi that was now becoming 
one of the most discussed political themes between the parliamentary forces. 
After Fanfani’s resignation, Bettino Craxi was nominated and led two 
executives from July 1983 to march 1987, giving him the record – unbroken 
until Berlusconi – of being the most long lasting Italian Prime Minister. For the 
first time, access to the Presidency of the Council depended exclusively on a 
political-party role instead of a long traineeship in an important ministry, as had 
always been the case in the Italian governing elite19. On the administrative front 
Craxi resolved the problem of his lack of ministerial experience by nominating 
the expert Giuliano Amato as his undersecretary; while in running his 
government he distinguished himself for his incredibly decisive personality20. He 
managed to convince three ex-Prime Ministers to come into his government and 
three party leaders, by formalizing the meetings as cabinet councils (Consigli di 
Gabinetto). He strongly and confidently exploited the prestige (and powers) of his 
institutional office, making this experience the first real anticipation of the 
process of personalization and presidentialization of the Italian executive. Even 
in his daily management – to give one example from many – while Spadolini 
tried to control the elaboration part of policy-making by calling and 
coordinating preparatory (and preventive) meetings, Craxi made more and more 
incisive use of the Prime Minister’s power to ask his ministers directly for 
explanations on specific subjects21. 
As far as the reform of the core executive is concerned, no legislative 
progress was made but the organization of the presidency of the council 
underwent a significant number of changes, often informal, that can be inscribed 
in a process of reinforcement of the executive power. Starting from the 
redefinition of communication and the agenda setting of the council of ministers, 
Craxi often personalized the government management, favouring the use of 
small collegial mechanisms. An example was the technical committee for 
economic policy: an organism with quite an agile structure, the concrete 
                                                                 
19 M. Calise and R. Mannheimer, Come cambiano i governanti di partito, «Rivista Italiana di 
Scienza Politica», n. 3, 1986. 
20 S. Colarizi and M. Gervasoni, La cruna dell'ago. Craxi, il partito socialista e la crisi della 
Repubblica, Roma-Bari, 2005. 
 
21 P. Calandra, Il Governo della Repubblica, Bologna, , 1986. 
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expression of a certain way of running the oligarchy that was characteristic of 
Craxi’s leadership22. The second mechanism, less original in that it was 
instituted for the first time by Spadolini, was in reality a committee of experts in 
economics, assisted by a technical staff, and created to supply the Prime Minister 
with all the information and advice he needed in financial matters, in the same 
way other democracies did for their heads of government. 
In his office, Craxi followed the dull Christian Democrat government for a 
few months, to all effects pre-electoral, and came to office in spring 1987, 
presided once again by Fanfani, who brought no significant changes in the 
organization of the PCM.  
The following executive, led by Giovanni Goria from the Christian 
Democrats, closed the political phase of reform of the presidency that went from 
the organization guidelines in the Giannini report to the presentation in 
parliament of the law no. 400 in 1988. A phase, as we have seen, characterized 
substantially by interventions from presidential initiatives of a prevalently 
informal type that existed alongside – in a continuous process of reciprocal 
adaptation – the normative acts. 
Law no. 400 organized the presidency of the council of ministers following 
four main indications that had emerged in the reports elaborated over the years 
from the different research commissions and regarded: 
– the organization of the systems of the presidency into departments and 
offices; 
– the creation of a secretariat in support of the council of ministers; 
– the reinforcement of the staff of the president; 
– a relationship of trust between the Prime Minister and his staff. 
These actions were supposed to follow two precise guidelines: unified 
management and organizational flexibility. The interesting aspects here, 
therefore, regard the competencies of the Prime Minister. Above all he holds 
powers of coordination and directives over the ministers. In particular, he can 
suspend the act of a minister and ask for the approval of the whole council. He 
calls the council of ministers and he initiates the questions of trust for certain 
measures; he nominates the undersecretary to the presidency, countersigns the 
acts with legal value and every other deliberation made in the council of 
ministers. Furthermore, this reform amplifies the Prime Minister’s power of 
nomination. From the running of the presidential staff and the general 
personnel, this law in fact allows for flexibility criteria taken from the spoils 
system model23, redefining significantly the relationship between politics and 
administration24. 
The Prime Minister’s staff – in the form provided for in the law we are 
analyzing – is organised in a series of policy structures. Among these, one of the 
                                                                 
22 C. Barbieri, Il Capo del governo in Italia. Una ricerca empirica, Milano, 2001 
23 F. Di Mascio, Partiti e Stato in Italia: le nomine pubbliche tra clientelismo e spoils system, 
Bologna, 2012. 
24 For an useful and complete review on this topic, see: 2014 Report on Public Administration, 
www.irpa.eu. 
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most strategic, collocated inside the secretariat, is the department for legal and 
legislative affairs (DAGL), which has the aim of coordinating the legislation 
initiatives and the normative activities of the government. The normative power 
of the government thus acquires, thanks to this law, a central role also from a 
formal viewpoint25. For the first time, in fact, the instruments with which the 
executive makes laws, starting from its regulations, are placed in a causal 
relationship with the administrative organization and, above all, with improving 
its functioning. The process of de-legislation and simplification of the 
administration started here26 and will see its apex in the following decade. 
Both from the procedural and normative management of the presidency, 
the most significant steps were made in the so-called period of institutional 
transition. It is in fact during the first half of the nineties that the government 
confirmed itself – starting from the executive led by Giuliano Amato – as “the 
true object of political innovation, promoting reform in vast sectors of 
organization, through the use of legislative delegation and urgent decrees”27 
Amato managed – no doubt helped by the particular historical moment – to 
conclude four large reforms in the sectors for health, national insurance, local 
finance and civil service, thanks to the instruments for normative powers held by 
the executive. 
The first novelty on the organizational level could be seen in the modality 
of formation of the government and its structure. An important intervention 
from the new President of the Republic, Oscar Luigi Scalfaro, in the consultation 
phase and a strong reduction in the number of ministers created an executive 
that was slimmer and characterized by a “prime ministerial nature” with an 
organization structured in a vertical sense. Above all, Amato did not nominate 
the Vice President of the Council, while the undersecretary to the presidency 
received the office for relations with parliament. Therefore – for the first time 
since the application of the Law no. 400 – the running of the relations with the 
parties inside the Parliament was entrusted to an organ in direct support to the 
Prime Minister instead of to a minister without portfolio. All the advantages of 
the substantial elasticity and organizational flexibility prescribed by the law on 
government organization emerged during this phase of crisis of the party 
system, allowing the Prime Minister to “verify the capability of the Italian 
executive to develop its independence when necessary”28 and, therefore, to 
enhance his role and powers of direction in the general policies of government, 
thus laying the conditions for a significant affirmation of premiership. 
                                                                 
25 N. Lupo, Dalla legge al regolamento. Lo sviluppo della potestà normativa del governo nella 
disciplina delle pubbliche amministrazioni, Bologna, 2003. 
26 A. Natalini, Le semplificazioni amministrative, Bologna, 2002. 
27 G. Pitruzzella, Forme di governo e trasformazioni della politica, Bari-Roma, 1996. 
28 G. Amato, Un governo nella transizione. La mia esperienza di presidente del consiglio, in 
«Quaderni Costituzionali», n. 3, XIV, 1994, 355 ff 
 The Prime Minister’s Office in Italy 
 
 
DPCE online, 2019/2 – Saggi  
ISSN: 2037-6677 
1629 
The following executive, formed in April 1993 by F. arlo Azeglio Ciampi, 
was characterized by greater room for negotiation for the Prime Minister, a 
trend that was to continue in the following decades29. 
Mostly composed of technicians and university professors – it was called 
“the professors’ government”30– it immediately dedicated great attention to the 
general themes of institutional and administrative reform. Minister for public 
functions, Sabino Cassese, started a process of organizational innovation over a 
very wide range, from public services to ministerial structures and companies; 
from the regulation of the civil service to the simplification of administrative 
processes, up to the constitution of new control mechanisms. These reforms 
were, yet again, implemented through the legislative instrument of delegation, 
thus contributing to institutionalize the passage of this constitutional policy 
from the arena of parliamentary decisions to that of the government. 
Furthermore, similar to what Amato had achieved in various sectors, Cassese’s 
reforms included measures connected to the financial law and also obtained the 
significant advantage of being associated to the control and reduction of the 
public deficit. 
On the specific question of the political reform of the presidency, Ciampi, 
supported by his deep knowledge of the government apparatus, was able to 
accelerate the process of the reorganization of Palazzo Chigi through two 
important interventions: one regarding the internal regulation of the council of 
ministers in November 1993 and the other the reorganization of the secretary 
general in March of the following year. 
These were two decrees that in practice codified all the positive aspects 
that the managerial experience of the presidency from 1988 onwards had 
brought to fruit, attempting at the same time to correct the faults. Once again, 
therefore, we can see a process of law making that is more and more 
characterized by the production of legislation rather than laws, that is by 
interventions over the medium-short period finalized at the realization of specific 
objectives. In this case, the normative intervention aimed at improving the 
direction of the executive by the President by reinforcing some of the staff 
structures, such as that of Secretary General, the Secretariat for the EU Affairs 
and, above all, the Ministry for Relations with Parliament. The different 
measures prescribed by the new regulation also had the objective of binding the 
Council of Ministers as a whole to a coordinated action. In fact, all the 
coordination and consultation activities, both internal and external to the 
executive, are reinforced: for example, internally, through the formal institution 
of preparatory meetings, that must necessarily precede the Council of Ministers. 
In this way, they finally formalized an organizational solution to the problem of 
the final phase of government decision-making where the ministers in the 
council have to discuss an agenda very often unknown to them.  
                                                                 
29 M. Cotta and L. Verzichelli, Manuale di Sistema politico italiano, Bologna, 2016). 
30 C. Chimenti, Il Governo dei professori, Firenze, 1994. 
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The Ciampi regulation, furthermore, also reorganized the external 
relations of the executive, starting from those with the parties in Parliament. 
Here, both through updating the calendar coordination and the tasks of the 
ministers for relations with parliament, the executive acquired a more decisive 
control over the agenda setting. In synthesis, therefore, the regulation of the 
council of ministers clearly shows an approach that attributes to the Prime 
Minister a preeminence that is not merely formal in the ambit of the cabinet and 
a rigorous style of co-responsibility for every minister. 
Despite the expectations, however, the very first majority government of 
the Republic is also the least innovative as far as the policies for the 
administrative reforms are concerned and, in particular, the managerial 
organization of the presidency. 
The first, led by Silvio Berlusconi in 1994, saw the Prime Minister 
prevalently occupied with solving the problems of his political coalition. He and 
his staff did not have the time, and probably neither the necessary administrative 
expertise, to dedicate themselves to redesigning the top organization structures 
of the executive. 
The following government, presided by Lamberto Dini, was for the first 
time since the war, made up exclusively of non-parliamentary technicians and 
bureaucrats, and with the exception of only two cases, by ministers with no 
previous government office. This exceptional case in the history of the Italian 
republic was further characterized by an executive with a high number of grands 
commis – mostly magistrates from the Council of State and from the Court of 
Auditors – placed in key roles in the ministries and in the Prime Minister’s 
office. Given the fixed period of his mandate, he did not have time to pay 
particular attention to the reform policies of the presidency, even though it is 
still an interesting case of management of the network of collaborators and 
structures of the Prime Ministers’ staff31. Looking closer at institutional reforms, 
Dini on several occasions declared to be in favour of reinforcing the role of the 
Prime Minister, in order to ensure unity of action in  the reform of public 
administration and the implementation of European directives. 
It will in fact be his successor, Roman Prodi, to make the turning point in 
the policies of reorganizing the executive. The government presided by Romano 
Prodi, in office from May 1996, made a true and proper redefinition of the reform 
policy for the Prime Minister’s office. This government, in fact, represented the 
beginning of a new phase of reform of the Italian core executive, after an initial 
period of organization procedures and a second phase linked mostly to the first 
actuation developments of the Law No. 400 of 1988. More generally, the reform 
of the administration as a whole became a central issue in the middle of the 
nineties on the political agenda and the government programme, and came out of 
the inner circle to become an issue also for public opinion.  
Appointed Prime Minister as the recognized leader of the centre-left 
coalition that won the general election of April 1996, Prodi was to direct an 
                                                                 
31 G. Negri, Un anno con Dini. Diario di un governo «eccezionale», Bologna, 1996. 
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important institutional reorganization of the government with a modality that 
was almost “prime-ministerial”. From a normative point of view, the road to 
reinforcing the government is through the use of delegation laws, that is, that 
legal instrument that parliament temporarily transfers to the executive for the 
realization of specific objectives. This is one of the important passages in the 
reform policy of the top Italian executive. The process of formulation of the 
decisions is in fact moved from the parliamentary arena, in which ambit the 
various political parts confronted each other on the Law No. 400, to the 
governmental area, where it is the head of the executive who decides. In 
particular, with the delegate Law No. 59 of 1997, Prodi proposed the 
reorganization of the three fundamental pillars of the executive: the system of 
autonomies, the ministerial system and state management32. The reform policy is 
thus articulated into a series of interventions regarding various specific sectors 
but held together by a unitary programme. From this moment onwards the 
history of the reform of public administration is no longer that of an 
(improbable) change without a project33 but one “of a project for a procedural 
and progressive change”34. 
On the more specific front of the reorganization of Palazzo Chigi, the 
principal objective that caused this substantial revision of the reform of the 
presidency – less than ten years from the application of the Law No.400 – was to 
regulate all the new structures assimilated over time and to redesign at the same 
time a true autonomy for the presidency that was separate from the other 
ministries.  
Finally, the instruments for flexibility in organization and management 
provided for in the previous law were improved and instruments for the so called 
horizontal flexibility were introduced which eventually allowed the recognition 
of diversified regimes in the various offices. These offices, therefore, would be 
differentiated not only according to their political or managerial activities but 
also in accordance with the application of the rules of the spoils system and the 
modalities for retribution, thus giving incentives to the personnel, and setting up 
in this way – a really exceptional case in Italian administrative system – a change 
orientated towards professionalism rather than only organizational solutions35. 
In this way, Prodi institutionalizes the procedure of frequent (and substantial) 
recourse to the figure of the external advisor, often coming from the private 
sector, that – as we shall see – will be fairly successful in future governments. 
The next executive, held by Massimo D’Alema, in the Council of Ministers 
of the 4th June 1999, approved one of the most important measures regarding the 
reform of the executive. In fact, they deliberated on the scheme of the decree law 
regarding the reorganization of the ministries then finally approved on 30th July 
                                                                 
32 Cfr Law 59/97 on the Delegation to the government for the Reform of Public Administration, 
published in the Official Gazzette, no. 98 of 29th April 1997, in particular, as concerns the 
presidency and the ministries, articles 11 and 12. 
33 G. Capano, L’improbabile riforma, Bologna, 1992. 
34 A. Pajno and L. Torchia, La riforma del governo, Bologna, 2000. 
35 M. Fedele, Come cambiano le amministrazioni pubbliche, Roma-Bari, 1998. 
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and which originates from the Decree Law no. 59 of 1997 dedicated to the 
reform of the government and approved during the Prodi government.  
In synthesis, it establishes an organization in departments for most of the 
ministries; the transfer of technical-operational tasks to agencies; the 
transformation of prefects into territorial government offices; a greater 
responsibility in the management of employees and financial resources; the 
reorganization of the staff and, most interesting, the thinning out of the 
organizational structure of the presidency of the council of ministers. This decree 
underlines explicitly that the presidency and the ministries are structures with 
different needs and therefore, must be reorganized according to different models. 
Finally, there was a proposal to reduce the number of ministries from 18 to 12. 
Naturally, the expected changes of the 1999 reform not only regarded the 
number of ministries but also their internal organization, the type of 
decentralization of the structures and the normative powers over ministerial 
organization. To this purpose all the ministerial structures dedicated to the 
coordination of policy making are strengthened and qualified, both on the intra-
governmental level and the inter-governmental level36 with the aim to create a 
lighter and efficient decisional centre. 
Even a first reading of the articles in the 1999 Law shows that 
emphasizing these points from the start is not a mere act of lip service to the 
constitutional provisions. It is, instead, the starting point of that organizational 
redefinition that could make the presidency truly capable of guaranteeing that the 
premier is in the condition of carrying out his primary tasks: political direction, 
coordination functions and relationships with other organs and agencies. Last 
but not least, this law gives the Prime Minister ample freedom of choice and 
organization. 
The presidential structures redesigned and redefined by the reform in 
order to assist the head of the executive can be divided into three sectors of 
competence: 
– the sector for politics, in which we find the departments and offices that 
support the Prime Minister in his tasks of political direction of the collegial 
organ, in the general political planning and in his decisions regarding political 
aspects; 
– the sector for policies, in which we find the departments that carry out tasks 
regarding the coordination of the normative activities of the government, 
internal control and monitoring of the state of implementation of the 
programme. To these can be added the structures destined for the 
coordination of particular policies for sectors considered strategic for the 
government’s agenda, policies for equal opportunities and against 
discrimination and policies for innovation in the public sector and public 
works. Finally, for the first time, there is an explicit reference to those policies 
                                                                 
36 On these topics, see: IRPA Report 2014, cit. and M. Cotta and F. Marangoni, Il governo, 
Bologna, 2015. 
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for institutional communication among the Prime Minister’s tasks that need 
adequate support. This is a sign that in Italy too, as in all the other western 
democracies, there is an urgent need to endow the top executive structures 
with adequate communication instruments, starting with those offered by 
internet;37 
– the sector of inter-governmental relations, containing all the structures of the 
presidency that allow the Prime Minister to coordinate the different levels of 
government and the relations with the other organs and agencies: parliament, 
the constitutional bodies, European institutions, the autonomy system, and 
the different religious confessions. It should be noted on this point that the 
organization of the presidency is particularly attentive (with two articles ad 
hoc) to the two dimensions of government that had undergone radical 
transformation during the last decade: the European dimension on one side 
and the local one on the other. It was probably these stronger driving forces 
that determined the decisive phase of the reform policy of the presidency. So 
much so that the importance given to these sectors of policy was also reflected 
in the new model of organization, which deemed necessary the institution of 
only two “political” departments: a department for EU policies and another 
for regional affairs. 
We now need to talk about all those functions of the presidency improperly 
attributed to it over the years and that, finally, as they are no longer “part of the 
autonomous functions of drive, aim and coordination of the president” (Art. 10), 
are now collocated in their respective offices. Some of these task transfers were 
immediate while others took a long time and regard the new ministries set up 
after the new legislation became effective. 
On an organizational level, the government following Massimo D’Alema 
and presided by Giuliano Amato, seemed to bring back to the presidency that 
well dosed mix of political administration that had always characterized the 
various paths of his career, starting from his role of undersecretary during the 
presidency of the two governments led by Bettino Craxi. On that occasion, he 
valorized the tasks of undersecretary, often taking on a primary role in the 
formulation of the council of minister’s agenda and presiding over several 
meetings at Palazzo Chigi with a managerial style that seemed to pave the way 
for a closer relationship between politics and administration. In all the decrees 
emanated between 2000 and 2001 we can see the objective of strengthening the 
structures of analysis and elaboration of policies, starting from the department 
for economic affairs which saw the addition of an office for technological 
innovation – that ensured support to the president in matters of technology, 
structures and services on the net and the development in the use of information 
technology and Internet broadcasting. This department, as prescribed by the 
reform of 1999, established activities of analysis and put forward proposals in 
economic policies as well as an evaluation of its impact on ministerial policies. To 
deal with these objectives, a revision of the professional aspects was added to the 
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structural reorganization: about thirty young managers were set on with the 
tasks of study and research38.  
Alongside the structures of policy, the organs for inter-institutional linking 
were strengthened which allowed the executive to coordinate the different levels 
of government: the department for relations with parliament, the linking 
structures with local governments and the department for EU policies. 
4. The Berlusconi Era 
With his victory in the elections of spring 2001, Silvio Berlusconi inaugurated as 
Prime Minister – and as the leader of his party – the new legislature. As far as 
the formation of his executive goes we can find a whole series of new 
developments39. First of all, the process of allocating the portfolios actually 
started before the elections: during one of the longest electoral campaigns in 
Italian political history, the candidate for president of the centre-right coalition, 
the ‘Casa della Libertà’, had in fact already presented its potential government 
team, together with its programme with an exorbitant and at the same time 
professional use of the media. Differently from his first government experience in 
1994, Berlusconi could this time count on a leadership and a coalition built and 
consolidated long before the elections. And if in the formation of the government 
both the coalition dynamics and the heightened role of the head of state played 
important parts, what was actually decisive was the presidential logic in 
managing the PCM40 in the same way as he had always personally managed the 
nominations of the directory positions inside his party41. 
Berlusconi chose many of his ministers from the most faithful 
parliamentary members of Forza Italia, beginning with three components of the 
presidential committee and tried to contrast the numerous obstacles caused by 
coalition logics thanks to the collaboration of an exiguous ministerial inner 
circle. 
Speaking specifically about the organization of the core executive the 
tendency for a politicization and personalization had already emerged in the 
nominations of the two undersecretaries to the presidency: on one hand by re-
proposing Giovanni Letta, his right hand – as well as being a much respected 
political counselor – in the role of secretary to the Council of Ministers which 
had already been his position in 1994; and on the other by nominating Paolo 
Bonaiuti as director of the sector for Communication and Forza Italia’s public 
image, as well as being the spokesman for the party and the Prime Minister 
himself. 
                                                                 
38 L. Lanzillotta La riforma della Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, in «Quaderno 
dell’Associazione per gli Studi e le Ricerche Parlamentari», n. 13, 2003,  pp. 165-176. 
39 M. Cotta, Berlusconi alla seconda prova di governo, in P. Bellucci and M. Bull (Eds), Politica 
in Italia, Bologna, 2002. 
40 M. Calise, Il partito personale, Roma-Bari, 2010. 
41 E. Poli, Forza Italia, Bologna, 2001. 
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As regards the administration of the presidency, the Berlusconi 
government – with a delegate law presented in record time42 – gave legal 
standing to the changes established in the 1999 reform without, however, 
bringing about any substantial modifications. The organization of the ministries 
showed an initial significant change in the number of ministers that went from 
12 to 14: the Health ministry was not grouped, as prescribed, to the ministry of 
Work and Social Policies and the Communication ministry was not made part of 
the Production Activities. Furthermore, the figure of a Deputy Minister, to 
support without substituting the undersecretary, was introduced and, finally, 
some of the structures of the presidency – such as for example Information and 
Publishing, the Civil Protection Services and Community services – which 
should have been placed under ministries or agencies were still at the 
dependency of the PM’s office. So even though Berlusconi’s ministerial structure 
does not overtly accept the innovations set out by the reform policy, his 
reorganization of the structures inside Palazzo Chigi did undergo certain 
changes. 
Despite the fact that Berlusconi found himself managing an office on the 
whole well organized, he decided to give the Prime Minister’s office his own 
personal touch with a series of interventions that culminated in the decree of July 
23, 2002. Here, as we will see, the most significant changes concerned: the 
simplification of the institutional communications, in particular as regards the 
administrative language; the reduction of information systems and some 
structures; the increase in the use of external consultants. 
The Prime Minister’s professional media skills and that of his consultants 
immediately had an effect on institutional communications. From the type of 
language used in the presidential administrative documents it was easy to see the 
intervention of experts who did not only come from administrative and public 
law. For example, in the case of the redefinition of the tasks of the public 
function we can find “innovation of the organization models”, “analysis of staff 
needs”, the upkeep of “computer data banks”, the roles in state administration, 
monitoring and verifying the implementation of the reform of the organization 
of public administration. With a more or less bureaucratic vocabulary and more 
orientated towards the private sector, the department for general affairs and for 
personnel became the “department for human resources and organization” where 
the President’s staff will no longer be “administered” but “acquired” and 
“trained”. The government internet site becomes lighter and more accessible. 
For the first time, there was a section with the list of offices and departments 
dedicated to the organization of the PCM, each one with the relative links to 
pages that further explained tasks and functions. And from the more general 
point of view of a centralized and integrated communication system, the Internet 
staff of Palazzo Chigi was incorporated into the structures of the PM’s press 
office. One of the most interesting organizational transformations in the 
                                                                 
42 The Law is no. 317 of 3rd August 2001, published in the Official Gazzette less than two 
months from the opening of the government. 
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structures of the PCM established by the Decree of 2003 regarded the re-
dimensioning of the department for economic affairs, which lost its competencies 
for introit policies, employment and small and medium business on one side, and 
technological innovations and information on the other. Some policies from the 
first group were entrusted to the department for territorial economic 
development (already prescribed by Prodi); while in the second case the 
department for innovation and technology was restored and entrusted to a 
minister without portfolio and used for coordinating policies to promote 
development of information technology companies. Its tasks included 
elaborating, promoting, updating and monitoring the plan of action for 
electronic government; encourage innovation in public administration through 
the guiding and coordination of innovative projects, and the use and acceleration 
of the dissemination of information technology and communication. The 
reduction in the competencies of the department for economic affairs 
corresponded to the strengthening of the ministry of economics that in this way 
institutionalized that tandem between the premier and the super-ministry for 
economics, typical of the process of presidentialization of the executive common 
to many democracies. 
If many systems had their tasks lightened, at the same time the number of 
external councilors was considerably increased. For example, a “contingent of 
experts”, eight in number, was added to the department for legal and legislative 
affairs. The department for public functions was allowed to have a maximum of 
ten experts in addition to those already prescribed by previous regulations. 
Finally, the office for internal control and evaluation was reinforced with the 
presence of consultants who had to deal with new tasks such as the optimization 
of managerial processes, updating methodology and the realization of 
experimental projects. The department for legal and legislative affairs, on the 
other hand, had to add to their function that of the predisposition and diffusion of 
documents through computer systems for the benefit of both public 
administration and the citizens: in practice this was a first step towards the 
implementation of the programme for e-government foreseen by the national 
plan of action. Finally, a department for instrumental resources was created 
which incorporated three pre-existing offices used for the same functions and 
dealt with the supply of goods and services, including services for information 
technology and the management of the presidency’s real estate. The redefinition 
of the general secretary’s office deserved deeper reflection because, while the 
number of services all around are being reduced, this office did in fact 
significantly increase its coordination tasks and its use of external resources for 
directors in the quality of consultants and experts for study and research. These 
tasks concerned in detail the analysis of the government’s programme, with 
explicit reference to the recognition of the commitments taken on by the 
government in parliament and in coherence with the objectives outlined in the 
programme. Furthermore, the essential function of support to the Prime 
Minister in his relations with the other actors of the government was stressed at 
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every level: the independent administrative authorities, the system of autonomy, 
the other administrations and bodies. Finally, the tasks of this office also 
included a structure called upon and presided by the General Secretary for the 
purpose of coordinating the inter-sectorial type of policies that involved several 
administrations. To cover this delicate role of coordination Berlusconi did not 
appoint a director from the private sector, nor an exponent of the Forza Italia 
party. Instead he invited a grand commis with proved technological-
administration expertise. Antonio Catricalà was in fact in the past a collaborator 
with the legal office of the PCM, and also the head of the secretariat and legal 
councilor in several ministries, and at the time of the nomination was General 
Secretary of the Communication Authority. 
With a reorganization of the presidential apparatus that was attentive to 
simplifying communication, reducing the merely managerial structures and 
strengthening those for policies through the use of experts, Berlusconi showed 
that he knew how to exploit all the available resources in his quarter of a century 
of administrative presidency. 
In 2006 Romano Prodi became Prime Minister for the second time. 
Once the first Council of Ministers met, quickly after its swearing-in at the 
Quirinale, among the first measures undertaken by the new head of government 
was a Decree Law by which a number of the competences of the presidency and 
the Council of ministers were revised with the aim – as stated in the press release 
issued by Palazzo Chigi – of reinforcing government and its programme. With 
an interpretation of Article 92 of the Constitution which was quasi-Prime 
Ministerial, Prodi tried to deal with the new legislature which presented, from 
the beginning, even in the eyes of the most optimistic, a route laden with 
obstacles.     
In the phase of formation of his second cabinet, Prodi immediately made 
recourse to the wide margins of government organization at the disposal of the 
President of the Council. In fact, during the first Council of Ministers, on the one 
hand Prodi nominated the without-portfolio ministers, the secretary-general of 
the presidency and the undersecretaries, and on the other hand, he introduced 
two important modifications to the organization of the executive. The first 
regarded the reorganization of ministries which, as we will see below, 
overturned the Bassanini reform of 1999. The second was more closely in regard 
to the presidency of the Council, in that the competencies of the inter-ministerial 
committee for economic programmes (Comitato interministeriale per la 
programmazione economica, CIPE) were transferred from the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance to Palazzo Chigi. Practically from the start of his 
executive, Prodi tried to centralize the functions of co-ordination of political and 
economic planning within the PCM. If a coalition government’s need to control 
the key economic policy themes from the nerve centre of the executive through a 
kind of inner cabinet directorate was not surprising7, it was also true that the 
decisive mode in which the new President of the Council had put this transfer in 
place was rather unusual. This could probably be attributed to, on the one hand, 
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the need to give an immediate sign of the policy direction to the party coalition, 
and on the other hand, an initial response to the risk of fragmentation of policies 
between the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Ministry of Economic 
Development, above all in the process of planning public investment.  
Alongside the nominations of ministers without portfolio there were those 
of a fiduciary type attributed to the president of the Council in the internal 
organization of Palazzo Chigi. Among the first to be nominated was the PCM’s 
undersecretary, Enrico Letta, former minister and expert in EU affairs and a 
convinced europhile like Prodi. The other three undersecretaries nominated by 
Prodi within the PCM shared the same personal fiduciary relationship with the 
premier and the same depth of political-administrative background.  
In the meantime, with a typical Italian logic of presidency building, the 
reorganization of certain structures and tasks of the PCM and the modification 
of the Italian spoils system were decided upon through the normative powers of 
the executive43. 
The government that followed the 2008 elections won by the center-right 
coalition led again by Silvio Berlusconi proved to be the second longest 
government of the Republic. 
The different interventions, again only organizational, aimed to: 
- improve the impact analysis on the regulation (September 2008) 
- improve the timing and discipline of the proposed regulations (November 2008) 
- improve the iter of the regulatory acts of the government (February 2009) 
- introduce verification tools to analyze the impact on the regulation (November 
2009) 
All these interventions, promoted by the DAGL, aimed at improving the 
function of coordination of the PM and strengthening his role. 
The Monti government that followed made only small changes in the 
organization of the PCM, by simply reducing costs and numbers of the 
presidential structures as part of their spending review policies. 
5. The Renzi Presidency 
On 22 February 2014, the President of the Republic Giorgio Napolitano 
appointed Matteo Renzi as President of the Council of Ministers. At the time of 
his appointment, Renzi is the secretary of the Democratic Party, elected in the 
primaries of 8 December 2013. Except for technical governments (Dini, Ciampi 
and Monti) Renzi is the first non-parliamentary member to become PM. He was 
President of the Province of Florence from 2004 to 2009 and then Mayor of 
Florence from 2009 to 2014. His government was one of the longest: longer than 
Romano Prodi and almost as long as the government headed by Craxi from 83 to 
1986, while the record goes to the two Berlusconi governments.  
                                                                 
43 A. Criscitiello, The New Government and the Spoils System, in A. Mastropaolo and J. Briquet 
(eds), The Center-Left's Poisoned Victory, New York, 2008. 
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The organizational structure of the PCM during his 1000 days of 
government follows the Monti decree of 1st October 2012. 
There are 4 offices in direct collaboration with the President: 
a. The President’s office, including its specific secretariat; 
b. The Press office and the President’s spokesman’s office; 
c. The office for diplomacy 
d. The office for military affairs 
 
The following Departments and Offices used by the President for his 
functions in general politics, coordination and technical-managerial support are 
to be considered general structures: 
a. The department for legal and legislative affairs (DAGL); 
b. The department for administrative coordination; 
c. The department for information and publishing; 
d. The office for internal control, transparency and integrity; 
e. The General Secretary’s office; 
f. The office for the Council of Ministers; 
g. The department for managerial policies, promotion and development of 
human and instrumental resources; 
h. The office for the budget and regularity control of the administrative-
accounting systems; 
i. The Office for State Ceremonies and Honours. 
Finally, there are 14 departments and 3 offices dedicated to public policies, 
in some cases with competencies that can be performed by ministries, in some 
cases structures that perform coordination activities between the different levels 
of governance and, finally, also merely symbolic policy sectors. 
From the point of view of the organizational structure, therefore, there is 
no direct intervention of the Premier. Once again, in fact, the issue of a “light” 
presidency, without ministerial functions but that becomes to all effects the office 
for the premier’s staff, is proposed in a law for the reform of public 
administration, the Law no. 124, 201544. 
What does, however, represent a real revolution compared to the past is 
the composition of the presidential staff and the appointing authority  as well as 
its decision-making style, in particular as concerns governmental legislation45 
and leadership46. 
Due to the characteristics of the Renzi leadership, the PM’s “political 
direction of government” provided for in the Constitution seemed to emerge, for 
the first time, as a specific task of the President of the Council of Ministers. In 
                                                                 
44 B. G. Mattarella and E. D’Alterio (eds), La riforma della Pubblica Amministrazione, Milano, 
2017. 
45 C. Deodato, Alcune considerazioni sui poteri del Presidente del Consiglio dei ministri nell'attività 
normativa del Governo L'evoluzione del ruolo del Premier nei Governi degli ultimi vent'anni, in 
GiusAmm.it, 2014. 
46 M. Calise, La democrazia del leader, Roma-Bari 2016; S. Ventura, I leader e le loro storie, 
Bologna, 2019 
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the past, this function, that the Constitution entrusts to the Premier, had always 
remained very vague. From time to time, autonomy and the individualism of 
Ministers was also threatened by the interference of political parties and intra-
coalitional conflicts. 
Providing a unique and clear political address to the executive was, for the 
first months of the Renzi government, a real policy, with a specific allocation of 
human resources and facilities aimed at both determining and verifying the 
executive’s goals. 
Renzi was able to create a sort of ‘control room’ (that before him no 
President of the Council was able to complete in a such personal and political 
way) where all the President’s men came from his party and where he was indeed 
the party leader47.  
Unfortunately, however, the history of Italian governments and the 
difficult management of the PM’s office have shown that a premier is strong only 
when the process of presidentialization in the three fundamental powers – party, 
executive and media – has been completed. The excessive personalization in an 
issue as important of the reform of the Constitution caused Renzi to neglect – 
and therefore weaken – the governance sphere, and led to his resignation in 
December 2016. 
6. Conclusions 
The importance of efficiency in the Office of the Prime Minister had become over 
the last decade all the more urgent in that there was the need to deal with the 
numerous political-institutional changes coming from both inside and outside 
Italy. The crisis in the party system, the modifications made to the electoral 
system, the acceleration of the process of integration into Europe and the 
decentralization of the functions and tasks towards a system of local autonomy 
had made a restructuring of the neuralgic centre of the executive absolutely 
indispensable, and, therefore, also a reform that was as radical as possible of the 
whole apparatus of the premier. With a governance that was ever more 
European on one side and ever more decentralized on the other, the PM’s Office 
was necessarily called upon to ensure the unity of the executive’s actions, 
collaboration between its different levels of government and the full assumption 
of responsibility in regard to its participation in the European Union. 
The main organizational objectives foreseen by the new order could be 
substantially found in the identification of the functions belonging solely to the 
Premier’s office; to the consequent redefinition of the organizational structure 
and to the transfer of the managerial competencies to other ministries and 
administrations. 
The so called “administrative presidency”48 which has often been 
interpreted only as a deficit of the necessary political force, in reality has, on 
                                                                 
47 F. Bordignon, Il partito del capo. Da Berlusconi a Renzi, Milano, 2014. 
48 A. Criscitiello, Il cuore dei governi, cit.  
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various occasions, shown itself to be a useful instrument in the hands of the 
Premier. 
During the difficult phase of the crisis at the beginning of the nineties with 
Tangentopoli, for example, the Law on the organization of the government 
allowed the President of the Council to «verify the ability of the Italian executive 
to develop its own independence, when this was necessary»49 and, therefore, to 
empower its role of direction of the general governmental politics, thus laying 
down the condition for a significant affirmation of the premiership. 
It was, again, the crisis in the political parties that led a technical President 
of the Council, Carlo AzeglioCiampi, to act in a significant way for the 
reorganization of the PCM, by writing up the internal regulations still in use 
today.  
On the other hand, the two premier party leaders with the longest lasting 
governments, Silvio Berlusconi and Matteo Renzi, who might seem to share the 
fact that they both nominated a very personalized PCM, in reality present a lot 
of major differences. 
On the contrary to what one would expect, Berlusconi used the instrument 
of “administrative presidency”, that is, the presidential decrees, several times, 
through which he tried to make organizational changes in the running of the 
core executive, making the most possible advantage of the 1999 reform. 
Furthermore, he nominated high bureaucrats as the heads of various structures 
in direct internal collaboration with the PM’s Office, and in very important posts 
such as the General Secretariat. 
On the other hand, Matteo Renzi, despite the strong reformist vocation of 
his executive, did nothing to change the organization of the PCM he inherited 
from the preceding executives. To note, however, is one important difference: all 
the top management positions at the PM’s Office, were from his party and his 
closest political entourage. This obvious politicization of his core executive led 
us to believe that Renzi, especially in the first months of his government, could 
do away with the «administrative presidency» model in order to build a 
«transformational presidency» based on a strong leadership, that could 
profoundly change the status quo. But, paradoxically, Renzi failed to change the 
Constitution precisely because of a highly personalized referendum.  
 
                                                                 
49 G. Amato, cit. 
